[[alternative]]Anticipated Emission Standard Policy and Transitional Dynamics by 陳智華
????????????????  ???? 
 
 
?????????????????????? 
 
 
?????????? 
?????NSC91-2415-H-032-014- 
?????91?08?01??92?07?31? 
????????????(?) 
 
 
 
 
????????? 
 
?????????? 
 
 
 
 
????????? 
 
????????????? 
 
 
 
 
? ? ? ? 92?10?30?
 
行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫 █ 成 果 報 告   □期中進度報告 
 
 
預料到的污染排放標準政策之長短期經濟效果分析 
 
 
計畫類別：■ 個別型計畫  □ 整合型計畫 
計畫編號：NSC 91－2415－H－032－014 
執行期間： 91 年 8 月 1 日至 92 年 7 月 31 日 
 
計畫主持人：  陳  智  華 
共同主持人： 
計畫參與人員：謝  易  儒 
 
 
成果報告類型(依經費核定清單規定繳交)：■精簡報告  □完整報告 
 
本成果報告包括以下應繳交之附件： 
□赴國外出差或研習心得報告一份 
□赴大陸地區出差或研習心得報告一份 
□出席國際學術會議心得報告及發表之論文各一份 
□國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告書一份 
 
 
處理方式：除產學合作研究計畫、提升產業技術及人才培育研究計畫、列
管計畫及下列情形者外，得立即公開查詢 
    □涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，□一年□二年後可公開查詢 
 i
中文摘要及關鍵詞 
 
近年來，為了滿足民眾愈來愈強烈的環保意識，眾多的環保相關政策因而相繼地施行，
因此，環境經濟學者投入了相當多的心力研究環保政策對於總體經濟的影響。既存文獻大多
將研究的焦點放在討論環境政策如何影響總體經濟的長期均衡上，然而，關於環保政策對於
經濟體系短期動態調整的相關討論，一直是被忽略的部份。觀察民主社會運作的模式可以發
現，環境政策在執行之前，必定經過冗長的立法程序、繁雜的預算編列審查過程，與特定長
度的緩衝期。也就是說，政策從訊息宣告到實際執行的過程會出現一段時間上的落差(lag)。
根據理性預期的理論可以得知，當訊息情報被揭露出來時，民眾會立即將此訊息納入它的情
報集合(information sets)中，修正她的預期，進而改變她的行為，引發經濟體系的調整。是以，
政策在實際施行前就已經開始影響經濟體系的運作了。 
本研究設計了一個理論分析模型，在模型中我們加入了環保的特質，藉此分析預料到的
污染排放標準政策如何影響經濟體系的長期均衡與短期調整現象。根據我們的研究得知，愈
嚴格的污染排放標準對於經濟體系長期的消費水準與資本存量的影響是不確定的。而且，當
排放標準政策將改變的消息一旦曝光後，民眾的消費與投資行為就開始發生改變，故經濟體
系的資本數量因此受到影響而改變。
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英文摘要及關鍵詞 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper develops an intertemporal optimization growth model embodying the nature of the 
environment, and examines the long-run and the transitional responses to an anticipated rigorous 
emission standard.  Based on our analysis, a rigorous emission standard has an ambiguous impact 
on both the steady state consumption and capital.  But, a lower in the emission standard may 
accumulate the stock of productive capital before the environmental policy implement. 
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Anticipated emission standard policy and transitional dynamics 
1. Introduction 
Typically, serious environmental damage has accompanied this rapid growth in many 
economies.  As a result, many pollution control instruments, (e.g., emission charge, emission 
trading, emission standard, etc.) are adopted for preventing environment degeneration.  
Environmental economists are usually predilection for the use of the emission tax to control 
pollution externality.  However, the ideal Pigouvian tax leaves a serious problem in practice since 
we are inability to measure the marginal damage of pollution.  As a result, the emission standard 
policy is often adopted for preventing environment degeneration.1,2  
The purpose of this paper is to try to set a theoretical model to examine both the long-run and 
short-run macroeconomic effects to a rigorous emission standard.  In order to incorporate the 
nature of environment in to analysis model, we first discuss the nature of the environment.  The 
existing literatures usually investigate the impact of the environment on the economy from demand 
side and supply side.  For the demand side effect, peoples usually prefer a clean environment.  A 
rise in the quality of the environment enhances the utility of the representative agent.  As a result, 
Huang and Cai (1994), Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994), Nielsen et al. (1995) and Schou (2002) 
introduce environmental quality into the utility function to capture the amenity effect of a clean 
environment.  On the other hand, Nielsen et al. (1995), Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), Musu 
(1996), Schneider (1997), Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) and Gottinger (1999) point out that the 
public must extract some environmental resources as an input for production.  The extractive use 
of the environment will produce emissions.  Under the zero extraction cost assumption, emissions 
can be viewed as a proxy for the extractive use of the environment.3  Based on this consideration, 
we take the demand-side effect and supply-side effect of the environment into our analysis 
framework. 
In addition, observing the fact that environmental authorities usually undertake policies with a 
pre-announcement, it seems that the analysis dealing with anticipated policies may be more 
realistic in the real world.  However, most, if not all, existing environment literatures are 
concerned with the effects of permanent changes in environmental policy, but ignore the 
transitional dynamics.  Based on such a consideration, this paper develops an intertemporal 
optimization model embodying the nature of environment, and uses it to examine the 
announcement effect of the emission standard on the steady-state impact and the transitional 
responses of macroeconomics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  A macroeconomic model with emission 
standard is outlined in section 2.  Section 3 examines the short-run and long-run impact of the 
emission standard shock.  Finally, section 4 summarizes the main findings of the analysis. 
 
2. The Model 
                                                 
1 The vast body of literature has made a comparison between emission taxation policy and emission standard policy.  
For a more complete review, see Helfand (1999). 
2 “The approach to pollution control adopted by the federal government has by and large been based upon the use of 
standards, both ambient and emission (or effluent).” (Harford (1978, p. 26) In addition, as illustrated by Helfand (1999) 
that the United States prefers the mandated standards rather than tax for controlling pollution, while pollution tax is 
often adopted rather than emission standard in Europe for maintaining clean environment. 
3 As documented by Nielsen et al. (1995, p.188) that “our treatment of pollution as an input reflects the idea that the 
services provided by the natural environment (including its function as a waste sink) enable the firm to increase its level 
of output for any given input of other factors.” 
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Consider an economy consisting of a representative household and a government.  The 
household produces a single composite commodity, which can be consumed, accumulated as 
capital, provided as abatement expenditure, and paid for as a lump-sum tax.  The government 
collects its tax revenue and provides public abatement to lessen pollution damage. 
The representative household derives positive utility from consumption, c  and derives 
negative utility from pollutants, P .  The objective of the representative household is to maximize 
the discounted sum of future instantaneous utilities:  
dtec,PU t∫∞ −
0
)( ρ ,              (1) 
where U  is the utility function and ρ  is the subjective time preference rate.  Following Keeler 
et al. (1971) and Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991) and Gradus and Smulders (1993), to satisfy 
the requirement that private consumption yields a positive but diminishing marginal utility and that 
the pollution damage yields a negative and increasing marginal utility, we impose the restrictions 
0>cU , 0<PU , 0<ccU and 0>PPU .  Moreover, 02 >− cPPPcc UUU  is imposed to ensure 
that the utility function is concave in the quantities c  and P .  
At each instant of time, the representative household is bound by a flow constraint linking 
capital accumulation to any difference between its disposable income and expenditure.  The 
household budget constraint can be described as: 
ktacPkfk δ−−−−= ),(& ,            (2) 
where the overdot denotes the rate of change with respect to time, a  is the abatement expenditure, 
t  is a lump-sum tax, δ  is the depreciation rate, and ),( Pkf  is the production function.  As 
indicated by Alfsen et al. (1992), Brendemoen and Vennemo (1994), and van Ewijk and van 
Wijnbergen (1995), that the environmental pollution lowers both the productivity of labor by 
harming the public’s health and the productivity of physical capital by depreciating the productive 
equipment.  We hence follow their pace to incorporate aggregate environmental quality into the 
production function to capture productive services of the environment.  To ensure positive, but 
diminishing, marginal productivity of capital, the restrictions 0>kf  and 0<kkf  are imposed.  
In addition, we assume 0<Pf  and 0>PPf  to ensure that the impact of pollution on private 
production is negative.  Moreover, 0>kPf  ( 0<kPf ) implies pollution is a complement 
(substitute) for the capital stock in production. 
The main source of pollution is the firm’s emission of pollutants.  Specifically, emission is 
an inevitable by-product of production, but can be lessened by devotion to abatement.  In 
common with existing literature, the flow of emission is specified to be positively related to private 
capital and negatively related to private abatement and public abatement, M .  In addition, firms 
face an emission standard e  that cannot be exceeded.  As a result, the household faces following 
restriction: 
eMake ≤),,( ,               (3) 
where 0>ke , 0, <Ma ee , 0<kke , 0, >MMaa ee .  In addition, we assume the cross effects are 
insignificant, i.e., 0,, =aMkMka eee . 
Total pollution emissions are given by the sum of emissions by the firms.  Under symmetric 
equilibrium and normalized to one, we have 
),,( MakeP = ,              (4) 
Following Ligthart and van der Ploeg (1994), Michel and Rotillon (1995), Elbasha and Roe 
(1996), and Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997), we assume that the household treats environmental 
pollution as given since the household feels that its activities are insignificant in affecting pollution.  
Given knowledge of the emission standard, the representative household chooses both 
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consumption and abatement expenditure to maximize the discounted sum of utility defined in 
equation (1), subject to equations (2) and (3).  The current-value Hamiltonian function H  is thus 
given by: 
 )],,([]),([),( MakeektacPkfPcUH −+−−−−+= φδλ , 
where λ  is the co-state variable which can be interpreted as the shadow value of private capital 
stock, measured in utility terms, φ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with emission. 
 The optimal conditions necessary for this optimization problem are given by: 
λ=),( PcU c ,               (5a) 
λφ =− ae ,               (5b) 
 φλδρλλ kk eekf −−=+− ]),([& ,           (5c) 
together with equations (2) and (3), and the transversality condition 0lim =−∞→
t
t
ke ρλ .  Equation (5a) 
defines that the co-state variable λ  is equal to the marginal utility of consumption.  Equation (5b) 
describes that the marginal benefit of abatement must equal to the marginal cost.  The differential 
equation (5c) is the Euler equation. 
The government is assumed to collect lump-sum tax revenue to finance its public abatement 
expenditure.  Assuming that the government balances its budget at any moment, the government’s 
budget constraint thus can be expressed as: 
Mt = .                (6) 
Plugging equation (6) into (2), the resource constraint for the whole economy is given by: 
kMacPkfk δ−−−−= ),(& .            (7) 
We can easily derive the following instantaneous relationship from equation (3): 
),,( Mekaa = ,              (8) 
where, 0/ >−= akk eea , 0/1 <= ae ea , and 0/ <−= aMM eea .   
Using equations (3), (4), and (5a)-(5c), the optimal change in consumption is given by: 
]),([
a
k
k
cc
c
e
ePkf
U
Uc −−+= δρ& .           (9) 
At the steady-growth equilibrium, the economy is characterized by 0== ck && , and k  and c  
are at their stationary levels, namely *k  and *c .  Substituting equation (8) into (7) and (9), and 
then linearizing the resulting equations around the steady-state equilibrium, we have: 
eda
a
kk
cc
a
a
k
c
* 

+


−
−


−=


23
13
*
22
12  1
0
&
& ,          (10) 
where 2212 /)( accaakkkkakkac eUeeaeefeUa −+−= , 2313 /)( accaakakPec eUeeefaUa −−= , 
022 >−−= kk afa δ , )1(23 −= aPe efaa ,. 
Let 1s and 2s  be the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system.  From equation (10), 
we then have: 
kk afass +−==+ δ2221 ,            (11a) 
)( 22331221 aakkkakka
acc
c eeeefe
eU
Uass ++−==∆= ,        (11b) 
As addressed in the literature of dynamic rational expectation models, including Burmeister (1980), 
Buiter (1984), and Turnovsky (1995), the dynamic system has a unique perfect-foresight 
equilibrium if the number of unstable roots equals the number of jump variables.  Since the 
dynamic system reported in equation (10) has one jump variable c ,  in what follows we impose 
012 <=∆ a  to assure such a unique perfect-foresight equilibrium. 
We now consider the steady-state effect of a rise in the emission standard.  It follows from 
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equation (9) with 0== ck &&  that the following steady-state relationship is derived: 
)],)(1())([( 233
*
aakkkkakkaaPkkakPaak
acc
c eeaeefeefafefee
eU
U
e
c −+−+−−−∆−=∂
∂ δ  (12a) 
)( 33
*
aakakP
acc
c eeef
eU
U
e
k −∆=∂
∂ .           (12b) 
Obviously, a rigorous emission standard has an ambiguous impact on both the capital stock and 
consumption.  Intuitively, the lower emission standard will reduce pollution damage, leading to a 
decrease (increase) in the marginal productivity of private capital.  This will discourage 
(encourage) the household to investment.  On the other hand, a lower in the emission standard 
will induce higher abatement expenditure to avoid that emission exceeds a more rigorous level.  
This will lower the marginal benefit of investment and hence discourage capital accumulation.  
The net effect of a lower in emission standard on the stock of capital depends upon the relative 
strength of these two effects.  It is clear from equation (12b) that a rigorous emission standard will 
raise (lower) the steady-state capital stock if the degree of substitution between the capital stock 
and pollution damage in production function is sufficiently small (large).4   
Next, we can describe the dynamic behavior of the system by means of a phase diagram. 
From equation (11b), we know that 021 <∆=ss .  For expository convenience, in what follows 
let 1s  be the negative root and 2s  be the positive root (i.e., 21 0 ss << ).  It follows from 
equation (10) that the general solution for k  and c  can thus be expressed as: 
tsts eAeAcc 21 21
* ++= ,             (13a) 
tsts eA
a
seA
a
skk 21 2
12
2
1
12
1* ++= ,            (13b) 
where 1A  and 2A  are as yet undetermined coefficients.  A graphical solution of the system is 
provided in Figure 1.  From equation (10), the 0=k&  locus is upward sloping, and the 0=c&  
locus is a vertical line.5  Furthermore, the SS  curve and UU  curve represent the stable and 
unstable branches, respectively.  As indicated by the direction of arrows, the SS  curve is upward 
sloping and steeper than the 0=k&  locus, while the UU  curve is downward sloping.6 
 
3. Dynamics of a Shock in Public Abatement Expenditure 
By using a graphical apparatus like Figure 1, this section proceeds to trace the possible 
adjustment patterns of the consumption and capital in response to an anticipated shock in the 
emission standard.  The experiment we conduct is that, at time 0=t  the authority announces 
that the emission standard will permanently rise from 0e  to 1e  at Tt =  in the future.   
From equation (10) we have: 
0
12
13
0
<
>
=
−=∂
∂
a
a
e
k
c&
; as 013 <>a ,            (14a) 
                                                 
4 It is clear from equation (12b) that 3kp
* /       0/ aaak eeefifek <><>∂∂ . 
5 From equation (10), the slope of the 0=k&  locus and 0=c&  locus are ∞=−=∂∂ = 11120 /)/( aakc c&  and 
0/)/( 21220 >−=∂∂ = aakc k& , respectively. 
6 It is clear from equations (13a) and (13b) that 0/)/( 121 >=∂∂ askc SS , 0/)/( 122 <=∂∂ askc UU 0> , 
0/)()/()/( 22122210 >−=∂∂−∂∂ = assaskckc kSS & . 
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0
22
23
0
<
>
=
−=∂
∂
a
a
e
k
k&
; as 023 ><a ,            (14b) 
In response to a lower in e , both the 0=k&  locus and 0=c&  locus may shift either rightward or 
leftward. 
To trace the component of 13a , and 23a , we find that key role to determine the sign of 13a , 
and 23a  are kPf  and Pf .
7  Specifically, 013 >a  ( 013 <a ) will be true if the substitution 
between pollution damage and capital is relatively large (small), and 023 >a  ( 023 <a ) will be 
taken place when the negative production externality of pollution is sufficiently small (large).  
Thus, in what follows four cases will be considered:  (1) kPf  and Pf  are relatively large 
( 013 >a  and 023 >a ); (2) kPf  and Pf  are relatively small ( 013 <a  and 023 <a ); (3) kPf  is 
relatively large and Pf  is relatively small ( 013 >a  and 023 <a ); and (4) kPf  is relatively small 
and Pf  is relatively large ( 013 <a  and 023 >a ). 
 
(1)  The kPf  and Pf  are relatively large ( 013 >a  and 023 >a ) case 
Under the situation where  kPf  is relatively large and Pf  is relatively small, 013 >a  and 
023 >a  will result.  We now use Figure 2 to study the adjustment process of the economy in 
response to an anticipated shock in the emission standard.  In Figure 2 the initial equilibrium 
where )(0 0ek =&  intersects )(0 0ec =&  is established at 0E ; the initial capital stock and 
consumption are 0k  and 0c , respectively.  From equations (14a) and (14b), we know that 
)(0 0ek =&  shift rightward to )(0 1ek =&  and )(0 1ec =&  shift leftward to )(0 0ec =&  in response to 
an anticipated permanent lower in emission standard.  The new steady-state equilibrium is at 
point *E , with k  and c  being 
*k  and *c , respectively.  
Before proceeding to study the economy’s dynamic adjustment, three points should be 
addressed.  First, for expository convenience, in what follows −0  and +0  denote the instant 
before and after the policy announcement, respectively, while −T  and +T  denote the instant 
before and after the policy implementation, respectively.  Second, during the dates between +0  
and −T , the emission standard remains at its initial level 0e , and point 0E  should be treated as 
the reference point that governs the dynamic adjustment of k  and c .  Third, since the public 
knows that the emission standard will increase from 0e  to 1e  at the moment of 
+T , the 
transversality condition requires the economy to move to a point on the convergent stable branch 
associated with 1e , )( 1eSS , at that instant of time. 
Based on these understanding, we now use Figure 2 to illustrate the dynamic adjustment in 
response to an anticipated lower in the emission standard.  We firstly draw a line connecting the 
initial steady state 0E  and new steady state *E .  This line is named the LL  locus.  As is 
evident in Figure 2, the relative steepness between the LL  schedule and the convergent branch 
)( 1eSS  is ambiguous.  If the )( 1eSS  locus is flatter than the LL  line, namely )( 11 eSS , then at 
                                                 
7 It is clear from the definition of 13a  and 23a  that: 
 313        0
a
aak
kP e
ee
fifa <><> , 
 
a
P e
fifa 1     023 <><> . 
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the instant of policy announcement, c  will immediately fall from 0c  to +0c , while k  is fixed 
at 0k  since it is predetermined.  Accordingly, the economy will instantaneously jump from point 
0E  to a point like +0E  on impact.  From time 
+0  to −T , as the arrows indicate, consumption 
continues to decrease and the stock of capital continues to increase.  At time +T , as the emission 
standard lower, the economy exactly reaches point TE  on the convergent stable path )( 11 eSS .  
Subsequently, from +T  onwards, both k  and c  will continue to fall as the economy moves 
along the )( 11 eSS  curve towards its stationary equilibrium *E  
On the other hand, if the )( 1eSS  locus is steeper than the LL  line, namely )( 12 eSS , then at 
the instant +0 , c  will discontinuously raise from 0c  to 
1
0+c  and the economy will immediately 
jump from point 0E  to a point like +′0E  on impact.  From +0  to −T , as the arrows indicate, 
c  continues to increase and k  continues to decrease.  When e  actually decreases at time +T , 
the economy exactly reaches the point TE ′  on the convergent stable path )( 12 eSS .  Thereafter, 
from +T  onwards, both k  and c  will continue to fall as the economy moves along the 
)( 12 eSS  curve towards its stationary equilibrium *E . 
 
(2)  The kPf  and Pf  are relatively small ( 013 <a  and 023 <a ) case 
Figure 3 depicts the transitional dynamic of an environmental policy shock under the situation 
that kPf  is relatively small and Pf  is relatively large.  In Figure 3, the initial equilibrium where 
)(0 0ek =&  intersects )(0 0ec =&  is established at 0E ; the initial capital stock and consumption are 
0k  and 0c , respectively.  In response to an anticipated permanent lower in ,  shift 
rightward to )(0 1ec =& , while )(0 0ek =&  shift leftward to )(0 1ek =& .  The new steady-state 
equilibrium is at point *E , with k  and c  being 
*k  and *c , respectively.   
We firstly draw the LL  locus which connects the initial steady state 0E  and new steady 
state *E .  As is evident in Figure 3, if the )( 1eSS  locus is flatter (steeper) than the LL  line, 
namely )( 11 eSS  ( )( 12 eSS ), then at the instant of policy announcement, c  will immediately rise 
(fall) from 0c  to +0c  ( +′0c ), while k  is fixed at 0k  since it is predetermined.  Accordingly, 
the economy will instantaneously jump from point 0E  to a point like +0E  ( +′0E ) on impact.  
From time +0  to −T , as the arrows indicate, consumption continue to increase (decrease), while 
the stock of capital continues to decumulate (accumulate).  At time +T , as the emission standard 
falls, the economy exactly reaches point TE  ( TE ′ ) on the convergent stable path )( 11 eSS  
( )( 12 eSS ).  Subsequently, from 
+T  onwards, both k  and c  will continue to rise as the 
economy moves along the )( 11 eSS  ( )( 12 eSS ) curve towards its stationary equilibrium *E  
 
(3)  The kPf  is relatively large and Pf  is relatively small ( 013 >a  and 023 <a ) case 
In Figure 4, the initial equilibrium where )(0 0ek =&  intersects )(0 0ec =&  is established at 
0E ; the initial capital stock and consumption are 0k  and 0c , respectively.  Upon a permanent 
lower in e , both )(0 0ek =&  and )(0 0ec =&  shift leftward to )(0 1ek =&  and )(0 1ec =& , )(0 1ek =&  
intersects )(0 1ec =&  at point *E , with k  and c  being *k  and *c , respectively.  As depicted 
in Figure 4, two adjustment patterns are possibly present depending upon the length of lead-time 
between policy announcement and implementation T .   
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At the instant +0 , c  will immediately raise from 0c  to +0c , while k  is fixed at 0k  since 
it is predetermined.  In consequence, the economy will vertically jump from point 0E  to 
different points between 0E  and D  in response to different values of T .  If the value of T  is 
smaller (larger), +0c  overshoots (undershoots) its long-run value 
*c , and hence, the economy 
instantaneously jumps from point 0E  to +0E  ( +′0E ) on impact.  Since point +0E  ( +′0E ) lies 
vertically above point 0E , from 
+0  to −T , as the arrows indicate, c  continues to increase and 
k  continues to decrease, and the economy moves from +0E  ( +′0E ) to TE  ( TE ′ ) as the arrows 
indicate.  At time +T , when the pollution standard is enacted, the economy exactly reaches point 
TE  ( TE ′ ) on the convergent stable path )( 1eSS .  Thereafter, from +T  onwards, both k  and c  
continue to decrease (increase) as the economy moves along the )( 1eSS  curve towards its 
stationary equilibrium *E . 
 
(4)  The kPf  is relatively small and Pf  is relatively large ( 013 <a  and 023 >a ) case 
Figure 5 depicts the situation where kPf  and Pf  are relatively small.  In response to an 
lower in e , )(0 0ek =&  and )(0 0ec =& shift rightward to )(0 1ek =&  and )(0 1ec =& , )(0 1ek =&  
intersects )(0 1ec =&  at point *E , with k  and c  being *k  and *c , respectively.  It is clear 
from Figure 5, two adjustment patterns are possibly present depending upon the length of lead-time 
between policy announcement and implementation T .  At the instant +0 , c  will immediately 
fall from 0c  to +0c , while k  is fixed at 0k  since it is predetermined.  In consequence, the 
economy will vertically jump from point 0E  to different points between 0E  and D  in response 
to different values of T .  If the value of T  is smaller (larger), +0c  overshoots (undershoots) 
its long-run value *c , and hence, the economy instantaneously jumps from point 0E  to +0E  
( +′0E ) on impact.  Since point +0E  ( +′0E ) lies vertically above point 0E , from +0  to −T , as 
the arrows indicate, c  continues to fall, while k  continues to increase, and the economy moves 
from +0E  ( +′0E ) to TE  ( TE ′ ).  At time +T , when the pollution standard is enacted, the 
economy exactly reaches point TE  ( TE ′ ) on the convergent stable path )( 1eSS .  Thereafter, 
from +T  onwards, both k  and c  continue to increase (decrease) as the economy moves along 
the )( 1eSS  curve towards its stationary equilibrium *E . 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper uses a theoretical framework to analyze both the long-run and short-run impact on 
macroeconomic performance to this anticipated rigorous emission standard.  Based on our 
analysis, it finds that a rigorous emission standard has an ambiguous impact on both the steady 
state consumption and capital.  But, a lower in the emission standard may accumulate the stock of 
productive capital before the environmental regulation implement. 
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計畫成果自評 
1. 在執行計畫時，我們發現只要依計畫書的構想，當代表性個人考量政府所設定的污染排放
限制時，的確會左右經濟體系的消費、產出與投資，進而影響總體經濟的均衡。更重要的
是，「預期」在經濟體系的確扮演著相當重要的角色，當私部門事先知道政策將改變的訊
息時，他將會改變他的行為方式，造成總體經濟產生波動。由於既存文獻缺乏關於預料到
的污染排放管制對於經濟成長影響的探討。是以，本研究的結果確實可以彌補既存環境經
濟學文獻發展中的不足，確有其學術價值，也適合於發表於著名的國際學術期刊。 
 
2. 本計畫的成果已經撰寫成學術論文，我們將聽取專家學者意見並稍做修正後，投稿國際學
術期刊。 
 
 
